**Material Anonymity and Phenomenology: A Critique of Merleau-Ponty and Some of his Successors**

**Abstract (134 words)**

I use Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s notion of material anonymity, which obtains when there is an adequate fit between a body and its social and physical environment, in order to clarify how the assumptions of Merleau-Ponty and several of his successors limit the applicability of their approaches. Perspectives arising from the starting point of disabled people’s lived experiences add to the trenchant critiques of Merleau-Ponty that feminist philosophers and philosophers of race, such as George Yancy, have developed. Material anonymity clarifies his tacit assumptions and ties these critiques together. The type of embodied experience he takes to be standard is actually one that only a privileged few consistently have. Phenomenologists need to account for the impact of bodily particularities and the ways that norms related to disability, race, and gender structure one’s being in the world.